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Source: Komersant.ua |
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Booming industry |
Before the war, Ukraine’s drone industry was nearly nonexistent. The state had only 7 manufacturers before the invasion. It relied a lot on imports. But facing Russia’s manpower and firepower, Ukraine turned to drones as a cost-effective and sustainable means. |
In just a few years, Ukraine became one of the world’s largest producers. It is now producing millions of drones per year. This is more than many Western states combined. There are around 500 manufacturers. This war-driven innovation model has become a case study for the states. It provides new methods to lower costs and accelerate development cycles. |
Ukraine’s production is unique because of its structure. But also because it is very flexible. The industry combines private manufacturers, start-ups, defense-backed companies, and small volunteer workshops. In big cities, industrial parks and university labs were repurposed into assembly and testing centers. These actors create advanced systems that can be produced in large volumes and tested on the field quickly. Feedback from the frontline allows engineers to change designs rapidly. These developments cycles are compressed in days or weeks. They take years in classic aerospace industries. The state now also benefits from a developed workforce. It includes skilled technicians, engineers, and operators. |
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Types of drones |
Ukraine produces a full ecosystem of drones. |
FPV (First Person View). These are small, pilot-controlled drones. They are usually modified from commercial drones. They can carry explosives and hold a kamikaze use. They are used a lot on the frontline as an attrition tool. They can hit trenches, vehicles, and soldiers. This is also explained by their low cost. Their cost ranges from 300 to 1000 USD. They have evolved to be more resistant to jamming and include AI-assisted targeting. |
Long-range strike drones. These drones ranges from hundreds to over a thousand kilometers. They can be used for intel and surveillance. But also, for strikes on oil depots, airbases, and logistics hubs inside Russia. In larger numbers they can saturate air defenses. Plus, they are much cheaper than missiles. These drones cost up to 35k USD while missiles cost millions. |
Naval drones. These are unmanned surface vessels. They are remote controlled or semi-autonomous. They are packed with explosives. They can be used to attack warships, ports and deny maritime access. They forced Russia to relocate part of its fleet and change its naval posture. These drones can also launch interceptor drones to counter aerial threats. This week, for the first time, this system intercepted a Shahed-like Russian drone. |
Interceptor drones. These are used to collide with enemy drones or detonate nearby. This is a way to lower the costs. Air defense missiles being very expensive. |
Surveillance drones. They are used for intel, targeting, battle damage assessment and artillery correction. Most artillery strikes today rely on these drones. |
Ground drones. These are an emerging but rapidly developing type of drones. They goals are very diversified. They aim to support logistics by bringing ammo and food. They can act as mine layer or clearers. Or they can also be used for casualty evacuation. |
On the battlefield, these drones are not used separately. They form a multilayered ecosystem. This creates a real network of drone-centric warfare model. |
Ukraine’s rising influence |
Ukraine uses its drone warfare experience to gain global influence. NATO and the EU showed interest in integrating its drone production capacity into future supply chains. The EU committed to the purchase of 2 billion USD worth of Ukraine’s drones. |
Ukraine and Germany agreed on a strategic defense partnership. It includes cooperation in drones’ production. It will also allow Germany to access to Ukraine’s expertise. In exchange, Germany will boost Ukraine’s air defenses. |
When the war in Iran broke out, Gulf countries turned to Ukraine for help. Indeed, Ukraine has been facing attacks from Iran-made Shahed drones used by Russia. Its expertise became crucial. Ukraine deployed anti-drone experts in the Gulf. |
Ukraine and three Gulf states also agreed on a 10-year defense deal. These states include Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar. The deals include: |
Co-production with plants in both countries, Cooperation to counter threats, Investments, Joint development of new technologies, Exchange of expertise.
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Ukraine received requests from 11 other countries for expertise and cooperation. |
Challenges |
Risk of Russia’s strikes. This is an obvious risk, avoiding destruction by Russia. To tackle that, Ukraine’s industry has developed a flexible and resilient production line allowing to shift locations. But this remains a daily risk that can prevent investors from putting money into a plant that could be hit by Russia. |
Foreign dependance. Ukraine increased its self-reliance. But it still depends on foreign suppliers for many components. One key supplier is China. The industry is trying to tackle this vulnerability. It has the government’s support. Companies that increase domestic component production can secure long-term government contracts. But Ukraine is also financially dependent on the West and ad hoc fundraising. It also needs NATO and EU support on certifications programs for its drones’ producers to enter these markets. |
Export debates and restrictions. There are oppositions in Ukraine on that subject. Some argue that selling weapons abroad means taking it away from soldiers on the frontline. They also say it could reduce global aid to Ukraine. Others argue that the government has limited funds and cannot buy everything the industry can produce, which is another challenge. Some companies relocated their ventures abroad, scaled back production, or closed because of a lack of government purchases. |
Investigations and corruption. There have been investigations by local entities on questionable supply chains methods. Some manufacturers used gray market channels for supplies. The latter said these were war-time measures to defend the country. They indeed faced imports troubles. Plus, even if Ukraine has improved, corruption and lack of transparency are still systemic in some sectors. These issues can dissuade foreign partnerships and investments. |
Post-war demand shock. This is a big long-term risk. After the war, demand can drop sharply, leaving the industry with overcapacity. This is why it need to transition to exports, dual-use drones, and integration within NATO and EU. General Cherry is already working on that. It made a partnership with the U.S. firm Wilcox Industries to produce FPVs and interceptors in the U.S. The company does not want to stay a local player in a saturated market with limited defense budget. This partnership is still awaiting formal approval though. |
Decoding geopolitics isn’t a job. It’s survival. |
Joy |
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